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Abstract—Proper incentive mechanisms are critical for 
mobile crowdsensing systems to motivate people to actively and 
persistently participate. This article provides an exposition of 
design principles of six incentive mechanisms, drawing special 
attention to the sustainability issue. We cover three primary 
classes of incentive mechanisms: auctions, lotteries, and trust 
and reputation systems, as well as three other frameworks of 
promising potential: bargaining games, contract theory, and 
market-driven mechanisms. 
Keywords—crowdsourcing, participatory sensing, mechanism 
desgin, bargaining game, contract theory, market mechanism 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Mobile crowdsensing (MCS) is a new crowdsourcing 
technique that exploits the sensing capabilities of personal 
mobile devices, such as smartphones and wearables, to 
collect data from a large group of individuals. It is 
advantageous in low deployment cost and vast geographic 
coverage, and has found numerous applications in diverse 
domains including transportation, environment monitoring, 
smart city, and pervasive healthcare. However, MCS systems 
often face the challenge of insufficient participation due to 
two reasons: (i) sensing incurs nontrivial costs to participants 
in terms of battery consumption, mobile data usage, time, 
and effort, and (ii) sensor-data collection may not have direct 
benefit to participants but often requires long-term 
commitment. Therefore, designing proper incentive 
mechanisms is pivotal to motivate the crowd to participate in 
and sustain MCS. 
This tutorial article provides an exposition of six 
incentive mechanisms (Fig. 1) that can be applied to MCS. 
This area of study is fascinating due to its interdisciplinary 
nature: auctions and lotteries are deeply rooted in 
microeconomics, while trust and reputation systems are a 
subject of artificial intelligence by tradition; bargaining 
games, contract theory, and market-driven mechanisms all 
sit on the boundary between economics and computer 
science. This article elaborates the first three mechanisms in 
length due to their wide adoption in the literature, but we 
also summarize the salient technical features of the other 
three because of their promising potential. 
Compared to its predecessor, crowdsourcing, MCS 
shares many characteristics with it, but at the same time has 
several unique features. MCS typically involves location 
dependency (geo-tagged data) and temporal continuity 
(collecting data continuously over an extended period), and 
each individual worker only participates in a few micro-
tasks. These features have significant impact on the 
incentive mechanism design, which we will elaborate. In 
particular, the temporal continuity also engenders the 
sustainability issue, where workers may not follow through 
the entire campaign but drop out in the interim. This is 
under-explored in the literature and is one of the foci of this 
article. A broader scope of sustainability, which 
encompasses other topics such as energy efficiency, security 
and privacy, warrants several other lines of rigorous 
research. 
 
Fig. 1. Six incentive mechanism frameworks with their key elements. 
II. PRELIMINARIES OF MECHANISM DESIGN 
Mechanism design concerns stipulating a set of rules 
such that players will act to the designer’s preference. 
Therefore, mechanism design is also known as reverse game 
theory, since game theory concerns reasoning about players’ 
strategy choices given a set of rules.  
However, the space of designing the set of rules appears 
to be infinite, making the problem seemingly intractable. 
This issue was remarkably alleviated due to the introduction 
of the revelation principle, which says that any arbitrary 
mechanism can be replicated by an incentive-compatible 
direct mechanism. Here, a direct mechanism is one in which 
players directly tell their types (i.e., private information such 
as cost) to the designer, and is incentive-compatible (IC) if 
truth-telling is optimal for every player. Thus, the revelation 
principle allows us to restrict attention to direct mechanisms 
only, which are a much smaller class as compared to the 
original design space. Another important property that needs 
to be satisfied by a mechanism is individual rationality (IR), 
which means that one should only gain or maintain his/her 
utility by participating. 
In practice, a player’s type is often unknown to other 
agents and the mechanism designer, who hence have to 
reason about the unknowns using prior (often probabilistic) 
beliefs. This is called an incomplete-information setting and 
is dealt with by Bayesian mechanism design. 
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The classic mechanism design theory, which is rooted in 
economics, focuses on characterizing the existence and 
uniqueness of equilbria. Its recent marriage with computer 
science gave birth to the theory of algorithmic mechanism 
design, which focuses more on how to reach a desired 
equilibrium through polynomial-time algorithms, with an 
emphasis on computational efficiency. 
III. AUCTION 
Auction is one of the most widely used incentive 
mechanism design frameworks in MCS. A standard auction 
consists of an auctioneer who sells some goods and a group 
of bidders who place bids to buy the goods. The auctioneer 
determines: 
 An allocation rule, which specifies “who gets what,” that 
is, who win the auction and what goods are allocated to 
them 
 A payment rule, which dictates “who pays how much”.  
A classic example is a Vickrey auction, where there is a 
single good and the allocation rule is that the highest bidder 
gets the good, and the payment rule is that the highest bidder 
pays the second-highest bid. While seemingly simplistic, 
Vickrey auction possesses three very desirable properties: 
dominant-strategy incentive-compatibility, maximal social 
welfare, and computational efficiency. 
When auctions are applied to MCS, the buyer and seller 
roles are often swapped: the bidders are now mobile users or 
workers who want to sell sensory data, and the auctioneer 
buys sensory data from them. This is often referred to as a 
reverse auction model, in which the allocation rule 
determines the winners (who are qualified to sell data) and 
the payment rule determines the size of payment to each 
winner.  
Standard auctions can be categorized into winner-pay and 
all-pay auctions according to who pay the bids. To allow this 
taxonomy to also cover reverse auctions, we generalize 
“paying” bids to “fulfilling” bids. Thus, fulfilling a bid in 
standard auctions means paying one’s bidding price, and in 
reverse auctions means surrendering a selling item. In MCS, 
the latter corresponds to completing a sensing task or 
submitting sensor data. 
A. Winner-pay auctions 
In a winner-pay auction, only the winners (selected by 
the allocation rule) need to pay or fulfill the bids. This 
conforms to intuition and has been widely applied in the 
MCS literature.  
For example in [1], n participants bid their respective 
desired payments bi for performing a sensing task requested 
by a service provider. The service provider (i.e., auctioneer) 
implements (a) an allocation rule that selects the lowest m 
out of the n bidders as the winners, and (b) a payment rule 
that pays the m winners their respective bids bi. This is 
essentially a first-price sealed-bid auction which does not 
satisfy IC, as a bidder could overbid (bi>ci where ci is his true 
sensing cost) and gain higher payoff. 
However, what is interesting in [1] is how the issue of 
sustainability is addressed. The authors observed that, as 
winner selection is based on bi which is lower bounded by ci, 
the auction tends to separate participants into constant 
winners and losers according to their ci after multiple rounds. 
Thus, the loser group may start to drop out as they would see 
little chance to win. The resultant shrinking participant pool 
would then induce the winners to increase bids, which imply 
a higher cost to the service provider and impact the 
sustainability of the campaign.
1
 To solve this problem, [1] 
gives “virtual participation credit” α to each losing 
participant after each round, such that his bid bi in the next 
round will be treated as bi’=bi – kiα where ki is the number of 
his consecutive losing rounds. Hence, a loser gets higher 
chance to win subsequently while his payment remains bi. 
Another winner-pay auction that specifically addresses 
sustainability is [2], which selects winners by combining 
their locations (for better geographic coverage) and reported 
sensing costs. To provide long-term incentives, the auction 
aims to satisfy a participatory constraint: the average 
frequency that a user is selected must be no less than his 
“dropout threshold”. Unlike [1], the auction [2] satisfies the 
IC constraint by adopting a VCG auction.  
VCG auction is an extension of the classic Vickrey 
auction for selling multiple goods, which corresponds to 
allocating multiple sensing tasks in MCS. A VCG auction 
allocates goods to the set of bidders whose bids maximize 
the social welfare (total goods value); in MCS, this means 
allocating tasks to workers whose sensing costs minimize the 
total cost. As for the payment rule, each bidder i pays his 
externality, i.e., the maximum welfare if i were absent minus 
the current welfare (when i is present) of others. 
B. All-pay auctions 
In an all-pay auction (APA), all the bidders need to pay 
or fulfill the bids regardless of who win the auction. This 
appears to be unnatural, and indeed, APA is rarely used in 
practice for selling traditional goods. But in fact, it exists in 
reality pervasively, but in a nonobvious form. For example, 
in political campaigns, job promotions, R&D competitions, 
and sports, all candidates exert vast effort (fulfilling bids) 
without knowing who will eventually win the competition. 
The theoretical foundation of APA is based on the notion of 
expected utility, which incorporates a winning probability 
into the utility function and thereby makes all-pay 
equivalent to winner-pay auctions in principle. 
The first work that applies APA to MCS is [3], where 
the APA is conducted as follows. After a task requester 
announces a sensing task, interested workers can 
straightaway participate in performing the task (e.g., move 
to specific locations and collect sensor data). Upon 
completion of the task (or after a predefined period), the 
task requester selects a winner based on performance 
(amount/quality of collected sensor data) and rewards him. 
This is all-pay since non-winners have also surrendered their 
sensing data (and effort).  
Compared to the winner-pay genre, APA has three 
desired advantages, as partially covered in [4]. The first is 
simplicity. A winner-pay auction consists of two stages (Fig. 
2): a bidding stage in which bidders submit bids to indicate 
their intent to participate (e.g., how much sensor data to 
collect and how much payment they desire), and a 
contribution stage in which only the winners (a subset 
chosen from all the bidders) perform the sensing task. In 
contrast, an APA compresses these two stages into a single 
bid-cum-contribution stage, in which all workers contribute 
straightaway without bidding their intent. For a requester, 
such a MCS campaign is simpler to organize. For workers, 
they no longer need to contrive a plan or intent just for 
                                                          
1 Strategic workers could do better by underbidding in earlier rounds so as 
to “elbow out” other workers and, thereafter, increase bids to gain higher 
payoff in the long run. However, in reality, workers are generally myopic, 
as also (implicitly) assumed by [1]. 
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doing a micro-task like sensor data collection; rather, they 
can quickly start and then “plan on the go” (e.g., the amount 
of data). This offers more flexibility and is better suited to 
the ad-hoc and “micro-task” based nature of MCS. 
 
Fig. 2. Winner-pay auction vs. all-pay auction in MCS. 
The second advantage is risk-free of bid nonfulfillment. 
Since a bid in winner-pay auctions is merely an intent to 
participate, there is little guarantee that the winning bids 
selected in the first stage will be fulfilled in the second 
stage. On the other hand, bids in APA are all fulfilled 
upfront (as actual contributions), which nullifies the risk. 
The third advantage is obliviousness to truthfulness. This 
is a special merit when applying APA to MCS, as APA does 
not exhibit it by itself. This merit says that IC, which is a 
main challenge in mechanism design, is technically 
irrelevant to all-pay MCS. The reason is that both the 
allocation and payment rules of all-pay MCS are no longer 
based on bids of intent but on bids of actual contributions, 
which are directly observable and cannot be lied about. This 
liberates mechanism designers from the IC constraint and 
allows them to focus on other important goals such as 
revenue maximization, IR, and computational efficiency.  
However, APA also has a disadvantage, which is more 
of a psychological rather than a technical one. That is, 
although the fact that APA entails a sunk cost to every 
bidder makes no mathematical difference in terms of 
expected utility, it demands the bidders to be fully rational. 
More specifically, APA can only guarantee nonnegative 
payoff in expectation but not on every realization, unlike 
winner-pay auctions. In other words, APA offers a weaker 
“sense of security” to workers. One remedy is to employ 
behavioral economics and marketing strategies, as suggested 
by [4].  
Tab. 1 summarizes the above comparison. 
 
 
TABLE 1. COMPARISON OF WINNER-PAY AND ALL-PAY MCS 
 Winner-pay MCS All-pay MCS 
Procedure 
Two stages: 
bidding and 
contribution 
Single stage: 
bidding cum 
contribution 
Risk of bid 
nonfulfillment 
Yes No 
Has challenge 
of satisfying IC 
Yes No 
Workers’ sense 
of security 
Stronger Weaker 
Revenue (total 
contribution) 
Equal (by the revenue equivalence 
theorem under standard assumptions) 
C. Sustainability 
As mentioned in Section I, the temporal continuity of 
MCS causes a critical sustainability issue in which 
participants may drop out due to lack of long-term 
commitment. One way to retain participants is to run the 
original “grand” auction in multiple iterations, each over 
shorter periods, such that the remuneration cycle is reduced 
and more winners can be selected. However, under such a 
scheme, many workers may keep losing successive rounds 
and thus still quit in frustration.  
Therefore, we suggest three modifications to traditional 
auction design to improve sustainability. First, redesign the 
allocation rule by determining winners using: 
 The (possibly time-discounted) cumulative contribution 
of each non-winner rather than his contribution in the 
current round alone, or 
 A discriminatory winning probability, which is a 
function of previous losing rounds, such that losers are 
“subsidized” with higher winning odds subsequently. 
Second, redesign the payment rule such that the reward 
is adaptive to the losing history of a winner. An example 
can be found in [3][4], which introduce an adaptive prize to 
vary with winner’s cumulative contribution so that workers 
are incentivized to contribute more than the case of fixed 
reward. 
Third, although theory shows no definitive advantage 
between single and multiple prizes in terms of revenue (total 
contribution) [5], we recommend the use of multiple prizes 
for MCS. This is because it curbs “starvation”, especially 
when the crowd size is large, and is user-friendly. 
Another feature related to sustainability is the 
microscopic nature of MCS tasks as mentioned in Section I. 
This feature calls for a minimal participation procedure, as 
otherwise it tends to outweigh the task itself and thereby 
prompts participants to leave. This advocates all-pay auction 
as a more favorable choice due to its one-stage bidding 
process. 
IV. LOTTERY 
Auctions have been extensively studied in economics for 
decades, and (primarily because of that) are widely adopted 
in the MCS literature as an incentive mechanism. However, a 
recent critique undertaken by [6] points out that auctions may 
not always be a good fit for MCS due to their perfectly 
discriminating nature. Intuitively, it means that one must 
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outbid everyone else in order to win; in other words, auctions 
are so competitive that “weaker” (lower-type) bidders will 
never win. Thus, while auctions could be a superior choice 
for crowdsourcing that solicits prime quality from strong 
players, they may not be well suited to MCS which aims to 
engage “grassroots” to perform very simple tasks like sensor 
data collection, where massive participation is of the 
foremost priority to achieve a required geographic coverage. 
Lottery---or its generalized form Tullock contest---is 
shown by [6] to be a good alternative to resolve this issue. A 
Tullock contest is a probabilistic game in which the winner is 
not determined by the rank of bids but by a probability, 
specified by a contest success function (CSF) pi =bi
r∕ ∑jbj
r
. 
Here bi is bidder i’s bid and r is a constant exponent. When 
r=1, it yields a lottery which is the simplest form of Tullock 
contests.  
The most salient feature of Tullock contests is that they 
are imperfectly discriminating: as bids only determine 
winning probabilities, everyone has a chance to win, no 
matter how “weak” he is. This is very attractive to ordinary 
workers who often constitute the majority of MCS 
participants, which is not necessarily the case in 
crowdsourcing in general. Therefore, as evidenced even by 
reality, many countries run national lotteries in which 
millions of people participate. 
Tab. 2 summarizes the above comparison, indicating that 
auction and lottery are two complementary mechanisms. 
When applied to MCS, a typical lottery is conducted in an 
all-pay fashion, in the sense that all the bids are actual 
contributions. 
TABLE 2. COMPARISON OF AUCTION AND LOTTERY 
 Auction 
Lottery / Tullock 
Contest 
Winner selection 
Perfectly 
discriminating 
Imperfectly 
discriminating 
Competitiveness 
/ Barrier to entry 
High Low 
Typical size of 
participant pool 
Small Large 
Contribution 
level from each 
individual player 
High Low 
Suitable 
applications 
Those favoring quality 
over quantity (e.g., 
effort/knowledge-
intensive 
crowdsourcing, 
contests) 
Those favoring 
quantity over 
quality (e.g., 
micro-task 
crowdsourcing, 
MCS) 
Suitable players 
Strong players (who 
are of higher types) 
Ordinary players 
Revenue (total 
contribution) 
No conclusive comparison (contingent 
on problem settings) 
Tullock contests are inherently more sustainable than 
auctions, because being imperfect discriminating allows for a 
more even distribution of winning positions and thereby 
helps participant retention. To further improve sustainability, 
one way is to incorporate historical losing records into the 
bid bi or the power exponent r in the CSF, such that the CSF 
gives favorable bias toward continual losers. Another way is 
to use the adaptive payment rule described in Section III, for 
which [6] provides a detailed reference. 
V. TRUST AND REPUTATION SYSTEMS 
Auctions and Tullock contests tend to use financial 
incentives, which may be less effective when: 
 The amount is insignificant (for example due to the 
“micro-ness” of MCS tasks), or 
 The task has moral implications (e.g., collecting 
healthcare-related data for seniors). 
Another issue is financial sustainability, which we address in 
Section VI-C. 
A widely used non-monetary incentive mechanism is 
trust and reputation systems. Trust is a local and subjective 
measure of relationship between two persons/agents, and can 
be derived from direct or indirect past interactions. 
Reputation is a global and rather objective measure by 
aggregating all other people’s trust with respect to a 
particular person. Trust and reputation have enormous 
influence on social recognition and peer pressure, and hence 
are effective and sustaining sources of motivation as backed 
up by both scientific research and practice (e.g., Quora and 
StackOverflow). 
A well-known online trust and reputation system is the 
Beta reputation system [7]. It uses a modified expected value 
of the Beta distribution to model the extent to which a user i 
trusts another user j, as T(i,j)=[g(i,j)−b(i,j)]/ [g(i,j)+b(i,j)+2], 
where g(i,j) and b(i,j) are the number of “good” and “bad” 
feedbacks i gave to  j, respectively. The reputation of j is then 
an aggregated value of all the feedback combined, i.e., Rj = 
(gj−bj)/(gj+bj+2) where gj=∑i g(i,j) and bj=∑i b(i,j). 
Trust and reputation can be used in MCS to incentivize 
workers to contribute more trustworthy data. For example in 
[8], the authors use a fuzzy inference system to determine the 
trust-of-contribution, given the quality of contributed data 
and the trust-of-participant. If the output trust is higher than a 
threshold, the reputation of the participant will increase, 
otherwise it will decrease. The reputation is then used as a 
scaling factor of reward, thereby incentivizing each worker 
to improve his quality of contribution and to contribute more.  
Another trust and reputation based incentive mechanism 
for MCS is simple endorsement web (SEW) [9]. It is a social 
network that connects participants using an endorsement 
relationship, where Alice endorses Bob if she trusts Bob to 
be a “good” contributor, or because of benefit derived from 
nepotism. 
Nepotism is a notion introduced by [9] to capture human 
nature more realistically, striking a tradeoff between egoism 
(as assumed by game-theoretical economists) and altruism 
(as argued for by philanthropists and humanitarians). 
Nepotism states that people could behave in the interest of a 
specific group of people whom they care about (e.g., family 
and close social connections), rather than being categorically 
egoistic or altruistic (Fig. 3). 
 
Fig. 3. Nepotism [9] strikes a tradeoff between egoism and altruism, 
aiming to capture human nature in a more realistic manner. 
Nepotism can be used in social-network based MCS to 
create incentives. For example, this can be realized by a 
revenue-sharing scheme [9] in which a worker who 
contributes sensor data and thereby earns reward (e.g., 
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reputation points) needs to share the reward with his 
endorsers. As a result, endorsers become beneficiaries of the 
contributor, and if they include his “nepotic” social 
connections, a new incentive is created for the contributor: 
“work for your cared (or loved) ones” (besides yourself).  
For completeness (to cover non-nepotic cases as well), 
endorsement is designed to be a mutual-beneficial 
relationship, where a contributor with more endorsers is 
deemed by SEW as more trustworthy, and will receive 
higher reward. 
Trust and reputation systems are generally more 
sustainable than monetary incentive mechanisms, due to the 
void of financial burden and the long-term social influence. 
On the other hand, a major challenge to trust and reputation 
systems is the cold-start problem, i.e., the difficulty of 
inferring the trustworthiness of a user during bootstrapping. 
There is a large literature on this topic which is out of the 
scope of this paper. 
VI. OTHER INCENTIVE MECHANISMS 
We discuss three additional incentive mechanisms which 
are less common in the MCS literature but have great 
potential nevertheless. 
A. Bargaining games 
A bargaining game concerns how to divide certain 
surplus (cooperation benefit) between two players. There are 
two classic bargaining models. The Rubinstein bargaining 
model takes a strategic approach to model the bargaining 
procedure as a sequential game, in which the two players 
alternately propose offers until one accepts the offer 
proposed by the other. The Nash bargaining model takes an 
axiomatic approach to focus on deriving an outcome that 
satisfies certain axioms [10]. Such an outcome is a tuple (r1, 
r2) that maximizes the Nash product, 
(u1(r1)−u1(d1))(u2(r2)−u2(d2)), where respectively, r1 and r2 
are the two players’ shares of the total surplus, u1(.) and u2(.) 
are their utility functions, and d1 and d2 are their status quo 
payoffs if an agreement is not achieved. 
MCS involves multiple workers, and we can apply a 
bargaining model by letting the task requester bargain with 
each worker separately while taking into account other 
workers. Using the Nash model as an example (e.g., [11]), 
let us suppose a task requester has a sensing task of value v 
and a worker is interested to undertake it. The requester 
wants a share r1 as profit and the worker wants a share r2 as 
reward, where r1+r2≤v. If the bargain fails (say with a 
probability p), they both fall back to their status quo payoffs, 
which are typically 0 for the worker but can be positive for 
the requester. The reason is that, with probability 1−p, the 
requester can reach an agreement with one of the other 
workers. This implies that d1>0 and d2=0, which then allows 
us to formulate and optimize the Nash product. Depending 
on the players’ risk profiles, the utility functions u1(.) and 
u2(.) may be nonlinear. 
The sustainability issue arises when some workers 
constantly fail to achieve an agreement with the requester 
and fall back to their status quo payoffs. This can be 
improved by giving higher bargaining power to “loyal” 
workers and workers who successively fail. One way to 
achieve this is to generalize the Nash product to 
(u1(r1)−u1(d1))
α
(u2(r2)−u2(d2))
1-α
 to create the asymmetric 
bargaining power case, where α<0.5 gives an advantage to 
player 2. Another way is to make the worker’s status quo 
payoff d2 a function of his/her loyalty or bargaining history.  
Moreover, as the bargaining process itself creates no 
surplus but can be costly, we can improve sustainability by 
automating the bargaining process using software. This is a 
non-theoretical tweak but can be very useful in practice. 
B. Contract theory 
Contract theory [12] deals with two players who take 
very different roles. One player, called a principal, has all 
the bargaining power and spells out a contract, which may 
contain a list of contract items. The other, called an agent, 
can only accept or reject the contract or accept a specific 
contract item, without counter-offering like in bargaining. 
There are two main contract models: the adverse 
selection model, in which the agent has certain hidden 
information that the principal tries to elicit, and the moral 
hazard model, in which the agent could exert some hidden 
effort that is of economic value to the principal, and the 
principal tries to induce a desired effort level at minimal 
cost. 
In the context of MCS, we consider each pairing of a 
worker and the task requester. In the adverse selection case, 
the hidden information may be the worker’s sensing cost. 
The requester can offer a menu of contract items each being 
a (cost, remuneration) tuple. To induce the worker to pick 
the contract item corresponding to his/her true sensing cost 
(i.e., to satisfy IC), the requester needs to pay an information 
rent which is the difference between the remuneration and 
the cost. See [13] for an example of how to set the rent. In 
the moral hazard model, the requester aims to elicit certain 
sensing effort from a worker so as to produce a sensing 
quality that maximizes the data value v minus the worker’s 
remuneration. As the effort is hidden and the quality is not a 
deterministic function of effort, the optimal contract is an 
insurance that gives the worker the entire, effort-dependent 
v while requiring the worker to pay a fixed “deductible”. 
However, if the worker is risk-averse, the requester needs to 
also offer a quality-linked incentive and make a tradeoff 
between incentive and insurance based on the worker’s risk 
profile. 
Sustainable contracts can be achieved in two ways. First, 
the contract can adopt an installment scheme rather than 
one-off payment: only after the worker has collected a 
certain portion of the total target amount of sensing data 
(with certain quality), will a corresponding portion of the 
total remuneration be paid to the worker. This not only 
motivates workers to follow through the entire campaign, 
but also shortens their waiting period and curbs impatience. 
Second, in the adverse selection model, the remuneration 
can include a bonus component on top of information rent to 
reward long-term workers; in the moral hazard model, this 
bonus can be incorporated into either the insurance or the 
incentive. 
C. Market-drivern mechanisms 
Monetary incentives may encounter financial 
sustainability as mentioned in Section V, where constant 
payments to workers could impose stringent burden on 
budget. One solution is market-driven mechanisms, which 
exploit the supply-demand interaction to create incentives 
and shed financial burden from MCS systems.  
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To run a market-driven mechanism, the MCS system first 
needs to create a market. Specifically, given that supply is 
provided by MCS workers, the goal is to create demand, i.e., 
attract consumers. This can be achieved by (i) offering a 
compelling informational service over the collected sensor 
data (e.g., via data analytics), or (ii) simply providing the raw 
data if it bears considerable value to certain users.  
The next step is to design a market-driven mechanism 
using one of the following models. In a fine-grained model, 
each service request from a consumer can be mapped to a 
specific set of data contributions. For example, a consumer 
may query “the average traffic speed of Road-7 in the past 
hour”. In such cases, the market can distribute the 
consumer’s payment to workers who contributed data to that 
particular spatio-temporal (S-T) window. As illustrated in 
Fig. 4, a requester who made a query at S-T point t1
s
 pays 
workers who made the set of contributions {q(1), q(2), q(3)}, 
and a query at t2
s
 pays to the set {q(3), q(4)}. Dynamic pricing 
[14] can also be integrated to determine the payment to each 
individual worker. 
st2
st1
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Fig. 4. Fine-grained model for market-driven mechanisms [14]. 
In a coarse-grained model, each consumption is serviced 
by mining a large set of data or multi-datasets; it is not 
possible or practical to pinpoint which particular 
contributions are used and to what extent. Therefore, supply 
and demand can be calculated on a macro basis using 
statistical methods to determine pricing and payment 
distribution. 
In both models, it is possible that each user plays a dual 
role of both data contributors and service consumers. A 
corresponding incentive scheme is provided in [15], which 
does not use monetary payments. 
Market-driven mechanisms thus improve sustainability 
by shedding financial burden from the system. They are also 
advantageous in their inherent ability to regulate supply 
imbalance between popular and unpopular areas, or peak and 
non-peak hours. This is achieved by charging a higher price 
to spatiotemporal regions with lower supply but higher 
demand, and vice versa, which incentivizes workers to move 
to system-desired regions to perform MCS tasks. 
VII. SUMMARY, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
Is there a rule of thumb as to which incentive mechanism 
fits which particular MCS applications? The answer is 
embedded above and summarized here. In general, auctions 
suit effort/knowledge-intensive applications while lotteries 
suit micro-task scenarios. Trust and reputation systems are 
best when the task has strong moral and social implications, 
while market-driven mechanisms are a superior choice when 
the sensing data have great commercial value; both 
mechanisms have good financial sustainability. Bargaining 
games suit the situation when workers and the task requester 
have comparable bargaining power, while contracts are 
preferred when the task requester dominates the decision 
making. 
While research in the area of incentive mechanism design 
is rich, the fundamental assumption of human rationality 
often faces challenge in reality. A relaxation of this 
assumption is the notion of bounded rationality, which has 
led to rising activities on behavioral economics. Another 
challenge is collusion among agents, which significantly 
complicates the design but meanwhile introduces a very 
interesting problem to solve. Heterogeneity and inter-
correlation of agent types pose additional challenges by 
often precluding closed-form solutions. Moreover, non-
quasilinear utility functions and uncertain risk-profiles have 
been much less studied and are worth future exploration. 
REFERENCES 
[1] J-S. Lee and B. Hoh. "Sell your experiences: a market mechanism 
based incentive for participatory sensing," Proc. IEEE PerCom, 2010, 
pp. 60-68. 
[2] L. Gao, F. Hou, and J. Huang, “Providing long-term participation 
incentive in participatory sensing,” Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, 2015, pp. 
2803-11. 
[3] T. Luo, H-P. Tan, and L. Xia, “Profit-maximizing incentive for 
participatory sensing,” Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, 2014, pp. 127-35. 
[4] T. Luo, S. K. Das, H-P. Tan,  and L. Xia, “Incentive mechanism 
design for crowdsourcing: An all-pay auction approach,” ACM Trans. 
Intell. Syst. Technol., vol. 7, no. 3, 2016, pp. 35:1-26. 
[5] D. Sisak, “Multiple-prize contests: the optimal allocation of prizes,” 
Journal of Economic Surveys, vol. 23, 2009, pp. 82-114. 
[6] T. Luo, S. S. Kanhere, H-P. Tan, F. Wu, and H. Wu,, “Crowdsourcing 
with Tullock contests: A new perspective,” Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, 
2015, pp. 2515-23. 
[7] A. Jøsang and R. Ismail, “The beta reputation system,” Proc. 15th 
Bled Electron. Commerce Conf., 2002. 
[8] H. Amintoosi and S. S. Kanhere, “A reputation framework for social 
participatory sensing systems,” Mobile Netw. Appl., vo. 19, no.1, 
2014, pp. 88-100. 
[9] T. Luo, S. S. Kanhere, and H-P. Tan, “SEW-ing a simple 
endorsement web to incentivize trustworthy participatory sensing,” 
Proc. IEEE SECON, 2014, pp. 636-44. 
[10] A. Muthoo. Bargaining Theory with Applications. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, U.K., 1999. 
[11] S. He, D. H. Shin, J. Zhang, J. Chen, “Toward optimal allocation of 
location dependent tasks in crowdsensing,” Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, 
2014, pp. 745-53. 
[12] P. Bolton and M. Dewatripont, Contract Theory. MIT Press, 2005. 
[13] L. Duan, T. Kubo, K. Sugiyama, J. Huang, T. Hasegawa, and J. 
Walrand, “Motivating smartphone collaboration in data acquisition 
and distributed computing,” IEEE Trans. Mobile Comput., vol. 13, 
no. 10, Oct. 2014, pp. 2320-33. 
[14] C-K. Tham and T. Luo, “Quality of contributed service and market 
equilibrium for participatory sensing,” IEEE Trans. Mobile Comput., 
vol. 14, no. 4, 2015, pp. 829-42. 
[15] C-K. Tham and T. Luo, “Fairness and social welfare in service 
allocation schemes for participatory sensing,” Computer Networks, 
Elsevier, vol. 73, 2014, pp. 58-71. 
 
